more than 30 years old. When modernization investments were needed most for these aging systems, soaring U.S. national debt provided a strong incentive to significantly cut defense spending, and the needed budgets were dramatically downsized. Mandatory across-the-board budget cuts to the military and other government programs (U.S. Congress 2011), threatened as the consequence if Congress could not reach an affordable budget compromise, came into effect. It began to appear possible, as desired by adversaries such as Al Qaeda and the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) , that the United States might incur such deep economic damage as to hamper its force-projection capabilities-endangering its ability to effectively safeguard national and global security.
Traditional Army acquisition processes did not incorporate fleet-level portfolio analytics methodologies to allocate available budget. Without such capabilities, Army leaders had only coarse mitigation strategies at their disposal (such as program cancellations and major delays), which typically sacrificed more capability, at higher life cycle costs, than was optimal. As budgets were reduced, key modernization programs necessary to stave off obsolescence were at risk of cancellation, and no clear, defensible way to prioritize them was available. The Program Executive Office (PEO) Ground Combat Systems (GCS), tasked with providing the most highly capable, integrated ground combat fleet on schedule and within budget, saw the need for an analytically rigorous process to inform critical fleet-modernization decisions. An operations research (OR)-based decision support project was created during this period of fiscal turmoil to improve the military's ability to effectively invest its increasingly scarce financial resources. The resulting analysis processes and tool, the Capability Portfolio Analysis Tool (CPAT), have enabled the Army to better meet future national and global security mission needs in the face of shrinking budgets and degrading systems operational effectiveness.
To execute this project, PEO GCS assembled a multiagency team, including Sandia National Laboratories, Booz Allen Hamilton, Army Materiel Systems Analysis Activity, Army Maneuver Center of Excellence, Army Fires Center of Excellence, and Teledyne Brown Engineering. Building a multiorganizational, multidisciplinary team was essential to the success of the project, which depends heavily on input, engagement, and feedback from both the broader Army analytical community and senior military leadership. Beginning in 2010, the team designed and developed CPAT into a powerful fleet management analysis application. CPAT utilizes a unique multiphase mixed-integer linear program (MILP) to optimize investment, production, and fielding decisions to maximize fleet performance under budgetary constraints and myriad complex business rules inherent to ground combat fleet modernization. As a result of judicious modeling and formulation techniques, CPAT efficiently solves complex large-scale fleet modernization problems, enabling agile response to evolving fiscal environments. CPAT also generates an extensive set of results to enable users to understand intricate modernization plans. These results, and the ability to represent a wide array of stakeholder concerns via different constraints, allow analysts to quickly assess multiple, diverse courses of action (COAs). Leveraging these features, CPAT analysis provides unprecedented insight for the Army's investment decisions, answering questions such as the following:
• What is the best possible plan, given current fiscal and programmatic constraints?
• What are the optimal investment choices if budgets are reduced further by a specific percentage, and what are the long-term impacts of these budget changes?
• How do program delays, budget cuts, and schedule restrictions interact to impact optimal fleet performance and composition?
• When should a program be concluded? How should any savings be reallocated?
• Is a potential COA affordable and feasible from a holistic portfolio perspective?
CPAT has been used in more than 40 analysis studies, yielding unprecedented insights to senior Army leadership and informing multibillion dollar strategic decisions concerning modernization of the Army's ground combat fleet.
Problem Description
PEO GCS' daunting modernization challenge involves the allocation of billions of taxpayer dollars per year over several decades ($50-$ CPAT's role is not to provide a single modernization plan for the Army to execute, but to provide analytic capability to address a wide variety of questions for a diverse array of stakeholders, each with different priorities, purviews, and sensitivities, and each with existing ideas of what should be done. The PEO must consider the perspective of other stakeholders, including (1) project managers within the PEO who must maintain the affordability and viability of their specific warfighting platforms; (2) staff within Army headquarters G3/5/7 (operations, plans, and training), who are primarily concerned with capability and planning; (3) the Office of the Secretary of Defense's Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation arm and Army headquarters G8 (financial management), who are concerned with cost and budgetary concerns; and (4) the Army Acquisition Executive (and supporting staff within the office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics and Technology) who must integrate the GCS portfolio within the entire Army acquisition process.
Although CPAT is primarily an optimization tool, it must be able to represent and assess a wide variety of stakeholder ideas (via additional constraints), even if those ideas impose suboptimality. Requested stakeholder analyses have included (1) sensitivity studies around program cost or performance; (2) assessments of various programmatic concepts (potential new programs, modifications of existing programs, or cancellations); (3) assessments of different production concepts (e.g., changes to initial production quantities or sustained production rates); (4) affordability assessments; (5) budget-reduction drills; and (6) analyses supporting capability portfolio reviews (CPRs) and long-range initial requirements analysis (LIRA).
To answer these needs, maturation of the CPAT modeling assumptions was needed to ensure realistic, applicable, and defensible model behavior while maintaining tractability. In the following sections, we introduce the most current CPAT problem structure and business rules necessary to define valid fleet modernization plans. We intend the terminology used below to capture general fleet modernization concepts; it is not necessarily standard Army parlance.
Problem Structure and Nomenclature
The fleet is a collection of vehicles that would contribute warfighting capabilities should they be called upon. Vehicles of various types (such as the Ground Combat Vehicle, Bradley M2A2, and Abrams M1A1 types) are used to carry out mission objectives. The fleet's composition is altered through time as old vehicles are upgraded or replaced by new ones. Vehicles are assigned to mission roles, which are unique areas of operational responsibility, such as main battle tank, command and control, or medical evacuation. Each vehicle type has a defined performance level for each mission it supports, quantifying its value across a wide range of attributes such as survivability against various threats or mobility in different terrains. Vehicles operate within a group (e.g., a military unit such as a brigade) that delivers a specific package of warfighting capability to combatant commanders. Sets are composed of similarly configured groups. For example, each brigade in the set of Armored Brigade Combat Teams has the same mission roles and number of vehicles in those roles but is distinctly different from brigades in the set of Stryker Brigade Combat Teams. Vehicles that are not currently assigned to the fleet (and therefore do not contribute to performance) are held in storage. Figure 1 depicts 
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Figure 1: Vehicles in the GCS fleet are assigned to mission roles within groups; similarly configured groups form a set. Vehicles not assigned to a mission role are in storage. Figure adapted from Melander et al. (2015) .
A purchase procures a quantity of new vehicles and places them into storage. These vehicles can either immediately replace old vehicles in the fleet or continue to be held in storage for later use. Each purchasable vehicle type has a defined per-unit cost. Upgrades turn a vehicle of one type into another type and can occur within the fleet (a mission upgrade) and (or) within storage (a storage upgrade). Upgrades have a per-unit cost that depends on the old and new vehicle type involved in the upgrade. A storage exchange swaps an existing vehicle in a mission with a new vehicle from storage. All purchased and storage-upgraded vehicles enter the fleet via storage exchange.
Each mission role (e.g., infantry fighting vehicle) has defined modernization options for the vehicles serving it. Figure 2 depicts examples for one such mission; each arc has an old vehicle type at the tail and a new vehicle type at the head. Here, status quo vehicles SQ1, SQ2, and SQ3 exist in the first year of the planning horizon (i.e., they are in the current fleet in different groups). SQ1 vehicles can be replaced by SQ2 or SQ3 vehicles if any such vehicles become available in storage (e.g., via displacement by a newly purchased vehicle). SQ1 vehicles can also be upgraded to SQ1-B, and SQ2 and SQ3 vehicles can be upgraded to U1. SQ1 and SQ1-B cannot be upgraded to U1 but can be replaced by U1 if any become available. Or, all three of the status quo vehicles can undergo a more fundamental transformation to U2, after which no further modernization is available. All vehicle types except U2 can be replaced by purchased vehicles of type NB, which likewise cannot be modernized further.
CPAT tracks several types of expenditures. RDT&E cost refers to expenses incurred for research, development, test and evaluation (RDT&E) of new and (or) upgraded vehicles prior to full production and procurement. Procurement costs are incurred in the process of modernizing vehicles and include costs for upgrades, purchases, production start-up, low-rate initial production (LRIP) units (built during production warmup for testing and training), and recurring yearly program and production costs. O&S cost refers to operations and sustainment (O&S) expenses incurred in the process of maintaining the vehicles in the fleet at a given time, and it is defined for each vehicle type within a mission role.
Business Rules
Feasible modernization plans obey an extensive list of business rules governing all aspects of the ground combat fleet, including structural organization, vehicle availability, production capacities and leveling, mandated retirements, conditional costs, conditional or interdependent fielding decisions across vehicles and missions, and yearly or cumulative budget constraints on the various expenditures described above. In this paper, we describe business rules only at a high level. business rules and formulation see the supplemental material (available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/ inte.2015.0824). A much more detailed explanation of the business rules and formulation can be found in Melander et al. (2015) and Henry et al. (2015) , respectively.
Constant Fleet Size and Mission Purity. In accord with the Army's current fleet-size plans (which are driven by strategic force-sizing processes and are not in the purview of CPAT), CPAT maintains a constant number of groups, and number of systems per mission in each group, over time. Any modernization either modifies existing vehicles or replaces them with an equal number of different vehicles. In addition, for logistical and operational reasons, group purity must be maintained; all vehicles serving concurrently in a particular mission and group must be of the same type.
Programmatic, Production, and Scheduling Rules. Programmatic, production, and scheduling rules are imposed so that resulting modernization plans make sense in the real world. For example, conditional fielding minima (e.g., "if this program is ever started, field at least this many vehicles") and cumulative or per-period maxima can be specified. Interdependencies between decisions are also captured; vehicle types may be mutually exclusive, upgrades may need to be synchronized across missions, or multiple production methods may exist for a given vehicle and some methods may be preferred over others. Mandates can also be used to define specific COAs; for example, a COA may require some quantity of specific vehicles to be added to or removed from the fleet by a specific date.
Collective Constraints. Vehicle types may share production facilities, RDT&E, and other resources; therefore, they can be placed into sets called product families, upon which all collective costs and constraints are enforced. As needed, constraints can be imposed on different (potentially interrelated) sets of vehicle types. Costs can be incurred for RDT&E (with costs conditional on the program start date), LRIP, production start-up, and (or) for yearly activities during production. Constraints may enforce the percentage of LRIP assets that can be fielded (versus held for testing and training), per-period and cumulative production capacities, minimum production rates, disallowance of gaps in production, production "smoothing" to reduce production rate volatility, and allowances for production ramp-up and ramp-down.
Budgets. Budgets can be defined per year (or cumulatively) for procurement, O&S, and (or) RDT&E costs. Budgets can also be defined for any combination of these three; for example, both procurement and RDT&E typically fall under an overarching acquisition budget. FY15  FY16  FY17  FY18  FY19  FY20  FY21  FY22  FY23  FY24  FY25  FY26  FY27  FY28  FY29  FY30  FY31  FY32  FY33  FY34  FY35 Performance contribution (%)
Priority Tiers and Optimization
Time period (FY) • Mission roles may be allocated to different priority tiers, because some COAs may require some missions to modernize without regard to others. Each tier is optimized separately with the budget and production capacity left over from previous optimization tiers.
• Each tier has four optimization phases: (1) minimize violation of any imposed schedule mandates, (2) minimize violation of budgets, (3) maximize horizon fleet performance, and (4) minimize cumulative fleet costs.
Each phase is constrained by the optima of previous phases. For example, phase 3 maximizes fleet performance without increasing scheduling rule or budget violations minimized in phases 1 and 2. This scheme allows diagnosis of infeasible business rules (e.g., overly aggressive schedule mandates) and allows assessment of over-budget COAs by always preferring budget violations to schedule mandate violations. The cost phase ensures that excessive costs are not incurred (e.g., on production of unnecessary extra vehicles) and later optimization tiers have the greatest possible leftover budget for their modernization. Figure 4 depicts the progression of tiers and the multiphase approach within each tier.
CPAT Analysis Methodology
The analysis methodology includes three distinct stages: pre-optimization, optimization, and post-optimization. Pre-optimization analysis generates the performance, cost, budget, schedule, and fleet size and structure inputs necessary to define the CPAT model. This stage involves intensive up-front elicitation from subject matter experts (SMEs) and persistent follow-on analyses to maintain data relevance. Leftover production capacity and budgets … Figure 4 : CPAT runs four optimization phases in each priority tier. Leftover budget and production capacity from each tier is allocated to subsequent tiers; prior phases constrain subsequent phases.
aggregates and distills optimal portfolio schedule results into relevant study insights.
Pre-Optimization Analysis
Collecting, organizing, and managing authoritative input data defining all necessary aspects of the ground combat fleet was a daunting task. We expended extensive effort to engage a wide array of Army organizations to capture and vet this data and gain acceptance from the Army analytical community. Although a unique story exists around each piece of input data, the example detailed below focuses on the methods used to capture one of the most fundamental inputs: the performance of a vehicle in a mission role. Each vehicle has unique attributes, and each mission has unique requirements; condensing vehicle performance for a mission into a scalar value involves scoring and aggregating raw vehicle abilities in a manner that ensures performance values are directly comparable. To do this, we used a multicriteria value modeling approach (Kirkwood 1997 , Brink et al. 1994 ) to develop (1) a hierarchical superset of value measures, (2) mission-specific prioritization weightings that aggregate these value measures into major attributes, (3) value functions that map raw vehicle performance attributes into value space, and (4) the raw vehicle performance data. Figure 5 shows this multicriteria aggregation framework. Mission requirements and desired vehicle attributes were distilled from numerous Army sources, including operational requirements documents (ORDs), capabilities development documents (CDDs), and capabilities production documents (CPDs). This process identified 49 measures in six major bins: survivability, growth (future capability expansion potential), lethality, personnel payload, mobility, and sustainability. Figure 6 depicts a partial list of measures, grouped into the six major attribute areas.
Because some measures are more important than others within a mission, we employed a swing-weight matrix approach (Parnell and Trainor 2009 ) to elicit prioritizations for each mission from a diverse Army SME panel. This approach guides elicitation by grouping measures along independent dimensions of importance (criticality to the success of a mission role) and variation (amount of difference between best and worst case) where, ultimately, the largest weights are assigned to measures having significant importance and variation.
Raw vehicle performance measures were provided by Army Materiel Systems Analysis Activity, the project managers, and Sandia National Laboratories based on test data, design configurations, modeling and simulation, and SME input. Because these raw attributes vary greatly in units (e.g., pounds, watts, miles per hour, meters, yes or no), we developed 49 value functions in close coordination with Army SMEs to appropriately map raw attributes into a uniform value space, thereby providing the 49 normalized measures. Taking a weighted sum of these normalized measures (using the swing weightings) results in the overall vehicle performance for a mission. Because of the particular weights for each mission and the particular attributes for each vehicle, each vehicle has a unique performance in each mission it supports.
Optimization Analysis
Execution of a CPAT MILP model is coordinated by a custom Windows application and involves several sequential optimization runs that feed information forward in the unique multitier, multiphase architecture we describe above. The application (1) enables input, organization, and visualization of the input data and stores these data in a database, (2) manages the data flow and operation of the multitier four-phase optimization by CPLEX, and (3) request involves the investigation of several COAs, each of which defines input variations (e.g., costs, budgets, schedule constraints) and requires separate optimization.
Post-Optimization Analysis
Each optimized COA contains a comprehensive portfolio modernization plan detailing which vehicles will be modernized, to which new vehicle type(s), in which missions and years. Understanding model behavior and summarizing results and impacts in an intuitive, actionable manner for a high-level decision maker is the final key analysis challenge. This includes assessing the downstream effects of modernization plans, such as ramifications to the industrial base (hiring or laying off workers from production lines) and operational impacts of partial modernization (different vehicles performing the same mission across formations). Currently, CPAT provides 40 unique results visualizations to help summarize, aggregate, and distill all aspects of an optimized modernization plan. In addition, separate COA models can be imported into a unified database, enabling comparisons between various plans so that the pros and cons of each COA can be thoroughly evaluated and understood.
Complexity Mitigation
In developing the CPAT architecture and MILP formulation, we encountered numerous technical challenges-particularly as the formulation grew over time to incorporate many new business rules. As additional behaviors were inserted, a formal automated testing process was vital to ensure that (1) all behaviors still operated as intended and (2) model run times did not become intractable. This testing process allowed consistent, efficient evaluation of mitigation ideas-ideas drawing from cutting-edge techniques such as the reformulation-linearization technique (Adams and Sherali 2005) and logarithmic binary reformulations (Veilma et al. 2010, Adams and Henry 2012) , among others. Although an exhaustive discussion of such mitigation techniques is beyond the scope of this paper, we discuss a few examples below. The most robust and efficient approaches were typically the classical ones, such as using Big-M constraints, disjunctive techniques (Balas 1979) , and auxiliary binary variables to represent fixed costs, logical constraints, and either-or constraints.
Decision Granularity
CPAT incorporates multiple levels of decision granularity (from individual-vehicle decisions to wholeprogram decisions) to preserve a tractable problem size and maintain an accurate representation of business rules. For example, decisions regarding vehicle fielding are denominated in brigade sizes; purchase decisions are denominated in user-defined batches. Decisions regarding systems in storage are made at an individual-vehicle level to accommodate the wide range of potential inflows and outflows. At the coarsest level of detail, long-range programs (those 20 to 30 years in the future) can be modeled by binary go or no-go decisions, which activate a completely prescribed fielding and production plan. This binary modeling of long-range programs has proven powerful in preserving modeling tractability; in one specific model instance, the increase in constraints and variables as a result of modeling long-range programs was 1.5 percent and 17 percent, respectively, versus an intractable 50 percent increase in constraints and variables had the new vehicles been modeled conventionally.
Linearizing Economies of Scale
Modeling the inherently nonlinear economies of scale, discontinuous cost functions, and conditional business rules associated with RDT&E and vehicle production is a challenge within an MILP framework. For example, most product families incur a nonlinear RDT&E cost profile over several years, and the exact shape, size, and timing of the cost profile incurred depends on when the optimization chooses to initiate production and fielding. As another example, product families can have a designated production rampup interval in which production must monotonically increase, followed by a steady state production interval. Here, the optimization decides (1) when to start production, (2) how to ramp-up, (3) what the steady state level is, (4) how to ramp-down, and (5) when to cease. To enforce these and other complex behaviors, we developed an array of auxiliary binary variables and constraints utilizing various classical concepts from 0-1 programming and logic reformulations to maintain a mixed-integer program that is linear in its constraints and objective functions. 
Managing Business Rule Violations
Prototype versions of CPAT treated all business rules, including budget and scheduling rules, as hard constraints whose violation would result in an infeasible, unoptimized model. As CPAT was exercised on more restrictive COAs in the years leading up to sequestration, infeasibilities became increasingly common and difficult to diagnose. Hence, we added penalty terms to the objective function-disincentivizing violations to business rules rather than disallowing them via hard constraints. As the model evolved, however, this led to an entirely new problem: preventing undiagnosable trade-offs between budget and schedule rule violations necessitated massive penalty terms that often caused numerical instabilities in CPLEX. This led to the development of the current, successful multiphase MILP architecture discussed above, which explicitly minimizes and retains schedule and budget rule violations in phases 1 and 2, respectively, and allows clear diagnosis without numerical issues.
Socialization and Acceptance
Building concurrence within the Army's analytical community around data and methodologies played a profound role in CPAT's success. We provided early and continual status updates to various organizations (including Training and Doctrine Command's Analysis Center and Army Capabilities Integration Center, the Maneuver Center of Excellence, Army headquarters G8, Army Materiel Systems Analysis Activity, and the Center for Army Analysis) to build a support infrastructure in which all participants were invested in the tool and its adoption.
We presented an initial CPAT demonstration at PEO GCS in April 2011, and following this presentation we made iterative adjustments to further align the tool with the ultimate strategic vision and evolving modernization environment. After a few months of refinement, the model and process were deemed mature enough to support an upcoming combat vehicle capability portfolio review (CV CPR). This marked the first time that the OR methodologies embodied in CPAT would influence established Army processes. Even this early in CPAT's life cycle, General Peter Chiarelli (Vice Chief of Staff of the Army 2009 Army -2012 Since the verification and validation, CPAT has been institutionalized within the Army (i.e., designated as a best practice for acquisition analysis) and utilized in support of a wide array of acquisition questions and difficult decisions, and it has led to a cultural change in other PEOs and a mindset change by project managers to use principled OR approaches and tools. Furthermore, as CPAT evolved via enduring engagement with stakeholders, a unified cross-stakeholder knowledge base regarding GCS modernization was compiled for the first time; this in itself represents a significant accomplishment.
Model Curation and Analysis Execution
From its inception, CPAT was envisioned as a quickturnaround capability that could provide stakeholders with answers to questions within days. Although this agility was key to CPAT's value, it also imposed challenges and required the expenditure of significant effort to ensure that when analysis needs arose, they could be addressed quickly and with high confidence. Coupled with constantly evolving data inputs and assumptions, these quick-turnaround schedules posed a significant risk of error with limited opportunity for correction.
To address these challenges, a number of tool and process improvements were adopted over the years. Early on, the application's ability to manage input complexity, provide input validation and visualization for model-checking purposes, and provide fast, effective results visualization, all significantly reduced analysis time and risk of human error. In addition, we developed a separate multiple-COA results engine application, which shortened the time needed to produce and carefully review multiple completed model runs from roughly one day to one hour. A formal analysis process with an enforced workflow was devised that ensured that an extensive checklist of due diligence steps was followed and all relevant context, data, models, and results were immediately preserved and shared within the analysis team during analysis execution. Along with ongoing maintenance (e.g., tuning and data revisions), testing, and judicious formulation choices, these tool and process innovations allowed the team to provide deep, analytically rigorous insights with high confidence, essentially on demand.
Major CPAT Results and Impacts
CPAT has provided unprecedented insight and decision support to senior acquisition executives within the Army and OSD. This insight proved valuable between 2011 and 2014 as the combined impacts of postwar draw-down and sequestration (U.S. Congress 2011) drove a reduction of nearly 50 percent in the Army's modernization acquisition budget. Without the holistic perspective provided by CPAT, budget reductions would have been handled in an ad hoc manner (program-by-program) leading to suboptimal acquisition investment strategies-a point that numerous CPAT analyses demonstrated. The OR techniques implemented in CPAT identified optimal acquisition investments under a wide range of budget scenarios, highlighted strategies that accomplished both strategic and fiscal goals for the portfolio during this highly constrained period, and ultimately saved significant future ground combat fleet capability that would have otherwise been lost.
CPAT changed the Army's culture and institutional processes around acquisition; decisions are now made with previously unobtainable levels of rigor and fidelity. It has been recognized by senior leaders that without CPAT, the Army's ground combat fleet performance would have stagnated, thus putting future capability and troop protection at risk. Based on CPAT's robustness, new acquisition best practices have been established and incorporated into other efforts such as long-range initial requirements analysis and capability portfolio reviews. This has provided the Army with substantially improved information in communications with Congress regarding multibillion dollar decisions. Key senior leaders within the Army and OSD have recognized the value of CPAT, as these quotes from 2011 to 2015 show:
CPAT provides guidance for multibillion-dollar Army acquisition decisions through unusually challenging fiscal environments-providing maximal capability and protection to our troops.
- CPAT has provided great insight into our challenges, and has helped us achieve significant improvements and billions of dollars in cost avoidance. FY14  FY15  FY16  FY17  FY18  FY19  FY20  FY21  FY22  FY23  FY24  FY25  FY26  FY27  FY28  FY29  FY30  FY31  FY32  FY33  FY34  FY35 targeted for cancellation by Army leadership. CPAT, however, consistently chose to invest in Stryker, even under significantly reduced budget scenarios. This insight provided the Army Acquisition Executive and staff within the office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology with compelling evidence to continue funding Stryker modernization programs as a high-priority investment.
Detailed Results and Impacts Discussion CPAT provides many result visualizations on all aspects of a fleet modernization plan. The most fundamental output for a given COA is the detailed fielding schedule (partially depicted in Figure 7) , which illustrates the composition of the fleet over time. In this example, the Cavalry mission modernizes all of its brigades several times to end up with 19 brigades of type Bradley CAV ECP III by the end of the 2033 fiscal year (FY33), whereas the Main Battle Tank mission does not modernize any brigades and retains the same composition throughout. The timing, rate of change, and compositional choices in these modernization schedules are important when parsing through COAs. The outlay of expenditures relative to the increase in fleet performance (Figure 8 ) is also important in examining the various pros and cons of a COA.
Figures 7 and 8 represent a small fraction of the possible results visualizations for examining a single COA. However, CPAT is used predominantly to evaluate and compare multiple COAs. Figure 9 depicts a visualization from one such comparative analysis that proved useful in understanding the PEO GCS investment decision space and trade-offs during the 2013 sequestration. For reference, the first stacked bar shows the performance of the current fleet in FY14 prior to any investments; each remaining bar represents fleet performance in FY35 (as a percentage of the current fleet performance) acquired through various modernization scenarios.
Specifically, in Figure 9 , the second stacked bar represents a plan manually specified by the Army (broadly defined using mandate constraints and priority tiers and then optimized by CPAT). The third bar represents a COA where CPAT is allowed to optimize without any mandates or priority tiers. The COAs in the fourth and fifth bars impose a 25 percent budget reduction in the initial five years of the planning period FY15  FY16  FY17  FY18  FY19  FY20  FY21  FY22  FY23  FY24  FY25  FY26  FY27  FY28  FY29  FY30  FY31  FY32  FY33  FY34  FY35 Performance improvement (%) Expenditures (B$) Fiscal year Paladin Integrated Management (an upgraded selfpropelled howitzer) and Abrams tank modernization, and the fifth allows complete freedom to CPAT decisions.
This illustrates a number of important points. First, under reduced POM budgets, GCV is not chosen voluntarily (bar 5) unless other high-level constraints are enforced that eliminate Abrams ECP I and PIM modernization (bar 4), clearly identifying a trade-off between investing in the new GCV program versus modernizing two existing vehicle types. The Army could not afford both sets of investments under the budget cuts. Further study of CPAT results showed that GCV's large up-front costs dominated the reduced budgets in certain key years, precluding other modernization investments. Thus, it was desirable from a performance and cost standpoint to discontinue GCV under such significant budget cuts, and this analysis ultimately supported that decision.
Another key insight highlighted in Figure 9 involves Stryker modernization (represented by the Stryker Upg vehicle type). In all three COAs that allowed some CPAT decision flexibility (bars 3-5 of Figure 9 ), CPAT recommended investing in a fully modernized Stryker fleet-even under significant budget cuts (bars 4 and 5). Contrast this with the lower-performing Army plan (bar 2), which allowed Stryker to modernize only using money left over in the budget after all other programs had been upgraded. Figure 10 plots each COA from Figure 9 and shows how horizon fleet performance increases and total life cycle costs (RDT&E, O&S, and procurement costs over the entire time horizon) decrease for those COAs for which CPAT chose full Stryker modernization. This value (bang for the buck) was repeatedly demonstrated in many separate CPAT studies. In one case, Stryker modernization accounted for only seven percent of the $44 billion acquisition expenditures (allocated optimally), while contributing 25 percent of the total fleet-performance improvement. This remarkable performance-cost trend demonstrated the excellent value of Stryker modernization and provided powerful evidence to OSD and Congress for Stryker preservation, ultimately saving it from cancellation.
As sequestration was implemented, stakeholders proposed many options to address curtailed budgets-options that unfortunately were not holistic or informed by optimization. As a result of comparing them to CPAT-optimized plans, these options were intercepted before they gained further support. For example, in Figure 9 , the CPAT-optimized COA in the Downloaded from informs.org by [149.164.131.166] fifth bar achieves higher performance than the manual COA in the second bar, despite a smaller budget. This is a superb example of CPAT's ability to allow the Army to do more with less; CPAT demonstrated how to save $3.5 billion and achieve 30 percent more final performance improvement per life cycle dollar than the existing plan. In another study, as budgets became even tighter, an updated manual proposal was compared to CPAT's optimum plan. The manual plan violated budget constraints; in comparison, CPAT found a plan-within budget-that saved $5 billion in acquisition costs for the same performance, via optimal reallocation of funding from GCV to other programs. During sequestration, CPAT analysis also provided insights into second-order effects of budget cuts and programmatic changes. One analysis demonstrated that as early budget cuts deepen, we see a nonmonotonic effect on total acquisition costs, which actually increase by approximately $2 billion once budget cuts reach 20 percent or more (see Figure 11 ). This somewhat paradoxical result arises because of (1) choice of programs that start later (thereby avoiding the up-front budget cuts) but are more expensive overall, which increase costs but push them out to years in which budgets are less binding, and (2) lost cost synergies with early investments that are no longer possible (such as investing in GCV and repurposing the vehicles displaced by GCV for use in other missions). This and other such analyses ensured that senior decision makers would be fully informed of the impacts of sequestration, preventing unpleasant surprises in the years to come. Portability CPAT has also had impact through its portability to other portfolios within the Army. The Army Acquisition Executive, the Honorable Ms. Heidi Shyu, has described the methodology developed for CPAT as "an analytical framework that can be used by our Figure 10: COAs in which CPAT has some decision flexibility recommend a high degree of Stryker modernization and achieve significant cost and performance improvements over the COA representing the Army plan, which imposes a highly mandated modernization schedule that deprioritizes Stryker. Note that horizon performance is expressed as a percentage of the performance of a hypothetical plan that modernizes nothing. Horizon performance (%)
Total procurement + RDT&E costs ($B) Figure 11 : As budget cuts in FY15-FY19 increase, overall performance decreases. Once cuts reach 20 percent or more, acquisition costs for the entire planning horizon increase.
which CPAT serves as a model for best practices in portfolio management. Leveraging the systems engineering rigor, modeling practices, and organizational relationships established for CPAT, PEO GCS also led the development of an optimization tool that explores the partslevel design tradespace of individual vehicle and other system types within the Army. The Whole System Trades Analysis tool (WSTAT) identifies Paretooptimal vehicle design choices that are efficient in multiple competing objectives, thus providing insight into the trade-offs between acquisition cost, myriad performance requirements, sustainment cost, and schedule risk. The Army has many unique instantiations of WSTAT supporting system development programs (as the examples in Figure 12 illustrate), and several more are in development.
CPAT research also led to a novel holistic portfolio optimization capability that integrates vehicle design into the fleet planning problem. A proof-of-concept study has demonstrated the incorporation of convex hulls of WSTAT Pareto frontiers into the CPAT MILP model. This optimizes not only when to buy how many of which vehicles, but also exactly how those vehicles should be configured; for example, using slightly less expensive vehicle configurations in one mission might allow an entire new modernization program for another. This capability is planned to be applied for the Combat Support and Combat Service Support fleet.
Summary
The CPAT team led by PEO GCS successfully addressed a highly complex, previously unsolved Army portfolio management problem. This success was made possible through the use of sound OR methodology, intense collaboration with the Army acquisition community, validated data sources, and senior leadership engagement. Over 40 CPAT studies have been completed thus far, saving or reallocating billions of taxpayer dollars and producing accepted analytic rigor for future fleet improvement. As stated by the Honorable Ms. Shyu, "with CPAT, Army leadership can now base investment decisions on rigorous portfolio analytics and provide the best capability to our soldiers while being responsible stewards of public Downloaded from informs.org by [149.164.131.166] funds." OR is becoming ingrained in the Army acquisition culture; CPAT is the go-to source for modernization planning under substantial budgetary pressures, is now institutionalized within recurring processes (such as capability portfolio reviews and long-range initial requirements analysis) and has paved the way for additional OR capabilities within the Army. With this legacy, CPAT will continue to help the Army avoid the potentially disastrous effects of long-term stagnation in the face of continually developing global security threats.
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